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SC No. 10382/67 25 October 1967

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Preliminary Assessment of BLACK SHIELD

Photography of 18 October.

Summary

The BLACK SHIELD mission flown on 18 October made two passes over North Vietnam north of the panhandle. Virtually cloud-free photographic coverage was obtained of about 50 percent of the country, including the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. All of North Vietnam's six principal airfields, nearly 70 percent of the SA-2 sites, and most of the railroad network north of the panhandle were photographed. No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was noted.

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Directorate of Intelligence.

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- 1. BLACK SHIELD Mission 6729-flown on 18 October-made two passes over North Vietnam north of the panhandle. Virtually cloud-free photographic coverage was obtained of about 50 percent of the country, including the Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The mission covered most of the high-priority MRBM search area. No evidence of surface-to-surface missile deployment was noted.
- 2. North Vietnamese Air Defenses. The mission covered all six of North Vietnam's principal airfields. Two of the airfields—Haiphong—Cat Bi and Haiphong—Kien An—were shown to be unserviceable at the time of photography because of bomb craters in the runways. The runway craters at Haiphong—Kien An, however, were being repaired.
- 3. Two of the airfields--Phuc Yen and Hanoi Gia Lam--were occupied by operational fighter air-craft. At Phuc Yen Airfield, 7-8 MIG-21s and 6-9 MIG 15/17s were observed,

At Hanoi - Gia Lam Airfield, six MIG-15/17s and two probable U/MIG-15 trainers were noted. The air order-of-battle total detected by this mission is close to the official estimate at the time of five MIG-21s and 18 MIG-15/17s.

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- 4. The mission photographed 153 of some 220 SA-2 sites in North Vietnam. Sixteen of these were occupied--including one new site, 119 unoccupied, and at 17 sites occupancy could not be determined. In addition, one site was occupied by dummy SA-2 missiles.
- 5. Naval Order of Battle. The following naval vessels were photographed in the Haiphong area: three SO-1 class subchasers, four to six Swatow-class motor gunboats, and eight motor torpedo boats-six of the P-6 class and two of the P-4 class.
- 6. Transportation. The mission provided coverage of 40 targets--19 bridges and 21 rail yards--

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that are included on the CIA priority requirements list for bomb damage assessment. The important Hanoi bridges over the Red River and the Canal des Rapides and the bridges leading out of Haiphong were covered. The Ping-hsiang and Dong Dang transshipment points along the China border were not covered.

7. Rolling stock on the Paul Doumer Bridge was observed for the first time in photography since the bridge was struck in August. ______ the bridge has

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been repaired.

- 8. Photography of Haiphong shows no unusual buildup of supplies there. This indicates that the North Vietnamese are still able to move supplies out of Haiphong.
- 9. Good coverage was obtained of most of the rail network north of the panhandle. The mission covered 100 percent of the Hanoi-Haiphong and Hanoi-Thai Nguyen-Kep rail lines, 75 percent of the Hanoi-Dong Dang line, and 65 percent of the Hanoi Lao Cai line. The photography showed that the Hanoi-Haiphong line remains interdicted at Haiphong and Hai Duong, and the Hanoi Lao Cai line is still interdicted at the Viet Tri Bridge.

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BLACK SHIELD ASSESSMENT

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